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Before there was marriage for samesex
couples, there was the civil union. It was a
precursor to marriage equality, one that
provided the benefits and obligations of
marriage without the name—a political
compromise before the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of marriage equality.
Although the civil union has been made
essentially irrelevant, it continues to raise
legal questions about the rights and status
of its participants. A recent case in New
York, O’ReillyMorshead v. O’Reilly
Morshead
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(http://law.justia.com/cases/newyork/othercourts/2015/2015nyslipop
25354.html) , shows continuing confusion about a status that was not quite marriage, but

not quite anything else either.
The Civil Union’s Role in History
Vermont was the first state to provide a marriagelike status for samesex couples, which
it did in 2000 in response to a ruling of the state’s highest court the year before. In
Baker v. State (http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supremecourt/1999/98
032op.html) (1999), the Vermont Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the
Common Benefits Clause of Vermont’s constitution to deny samesex couples the right to
marry or the right to enter into a substantially comparable, and legally recognized,
relationship.
In the 180 days the court gave the legislature to craft an appropriate remedy for this
violation, the legislature conceived of a new status—the civil union—that was identical to
marriage in every respect other than name. Indeed, the Civil Union Act itself was short,
since it globally amended all statutes referring to “husband” or “wife” with “or civil union
partner” and marriage with “or civil union.” In implementation, Vermont courts treated
civil unions like marriages, as the legislature intended. Civil union partners were granted
the full panoply of rights and obligations, numbering at least in the hundreds, as married
couples.
The civil union played a limited role in the national story on marriage equality. A handful
of other states adopted their own civil union law, but most eventually replaced it with a
marriage equality law as public opinion shifted and political pressure to “defend”
traditional marriage against the gayrights attack waned. But during the years when some
states allowed samesex couples to marry, some states allowed them to form civil unions
but not marriages, and some states allowed no type of formal recognition, confusion
abounded when civil union couples traveled or moved to states that did not have their
own civil union laws.
The limbo that plagued civil union couples was well documented. A Vermont Commission
on Family Recognition and Protection studied and summarized many of them in a 2007
report (http://www.leg.state.vt.us/workgroups/FamilyCommission/) . Chief among
the difficulties was the near impossibility of dissolving civil unions. When civil unions
were only available in Vermont, but contracted disproportionately by nonresidents, this
problem was especially acute. Under the original law, outofstate couples could not
divorce in Vermont because only residents could file for divorce there. (Vermont later
enacted a law to allow nonresident couples to dissolve civil unions in Vermont upon
proof that their home states would not entertain a suit for divorce.) And, for the most
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/24/thoughobsoletethecivilunioncontinuestomystifycourts
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part, such couples could not file in their home states, either, because the law did not
recognize the civil union or any other legal form of samesex relationship. As I
discussed in 2003 (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20030520.html) ,
some individuals found a sympathetic court to dissolve the union based on “equitable
principles,” but many couples remained stuck in civil unions years after the end of the
actual relationship because of this noncomplementary patchwork of laws.
Obergefell v. Hodges and the End of the Civil Union
In June 2015, the Supreme Court ended decades of conflict over whether samesex
couples ought to be permitted to marry or have their marriages respected as they crossed
from one state to the next. (A detailed analysis of the ruling and the history that led to it is
available here (https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/26/fromzerotofiftyineleven
years) .)
In a simple holding, the Court held, in Obergefell v. Hodges
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14556/) , that:

The Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar samesex couples from
marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex. . . .
[T]he Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful
basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful samesex marriage performed
in another State on the ground of its samesex character.
This ruling put an end to bans on marriages by samesex couples, but it also, practically
speaking, put an end to the civil union. It was no longer constitutional for states to deny
marriage equality for samesex couples and thus no longer necessary to provide a
marriage alternative to them.
Obergefell answered many questions, but raised others. As I have written previously
(https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/15/whenonedooropensanothercloses) , the
ruling in favor of marriage equality resolved some complex issues of parentage, but
destabilized others. The same is true for the economic consequences of marriage.
O’Reilly Morshead v. O’ReillyMorshead: Is a Civil Union a Marriage for
Equitable Distribution Purposes?
The two women involved in this case, Deborah and Christine, moved to New York in
2002. They entered into a civil union in Vermont in 2003. At the time, this was the only
option for samesex couples seeking formal recognition, as the first state would not issue
marriage licenses to samesex couples until May 2004, and a majority of civil union
entrants resided outside Vermont. Deborah and Christine then married in Canada in
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/24/thoughobsoletethecivilunioncontinuestomystifycourts
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2006 after marriage equality was adopted there.
Now, the parties agree on only one thing—that they want a divorce. But they disagree
about when they got married, a date that matters because it’s relevant to the equitable
distribution of property. Under New York law, only marital property can be equitably
divided in a divorce proceeding, and marital property accrues only during a legal
marriage. (The category of “marital property” is further limited to property earned by
either spouse during marriage, as opposed to property acquired through other means
such as gift or inheritance.) The dispute in this case thus resolves around property
acquired between 2003—the beginning of the civil union—and 2006—the beginning of
the Canadian marriage, although the opinion does not make clear whether the most
contested piece of property (a house) was acquired with earnings (a prerequisite to its
being deemed marital property). But since the court treats the date of marriage as
important, it must have deemed the disputed property to be marital as long as it was
acquired during a legal marriage. So that is the $64,000 question: when did the parties
marry for equitable distribution purposes?
The court’s opinion is long on platitudes and poeticisms, but a little short on persuasive
analysis. (Some of the writing falls short as well, such as the claim that “I” is an overused
pronoun (?), and that the words “I do” become innocuous when “separated, even by a
comma.” I challenge the reader to come up with a sentence in which “I, do” could be
used.)
Although courts in noncivilunion states used to divide over whether they could dissolve
civil unions, several lower courts had agreed to do so in New York based on equitable
principles. After Obergefell, it is clear that samesex married couples can divorce or seek
annulments on the same terms as any other married couple. But must civil unions also be
dissolved on the same terms?
This court—only a trial court and subject to reversal on appeal—said no. Courts can
dissolve civil unions, but only by drawing on their general powers of equity. And in that
nebulous process, courts cannot—in the view of this particular court—make rulings about
custody, property division, or spousal support that would ordinarily accompany a decree
of divorce.
But could a civil union nonetheless signify the beginning of a marital union, especially for
a couple who later enters a civil marriage? Again, this court said no. A civil union is not
the equivalent of marriage. The court was admittedly dealing with two inconsistent
precedents. An appellate division ruling in 2005, Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital
(http://law.justia.com/cases/newyork/appellatedivisionsecond
department/2005/200507495.html) , held that a civil union partner was not a
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/24/thoughobsoletethecivilunioncontinuestomystifycourts
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surviving spouse for purposes of the state’s wrongful death law. As I wrote at the time
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20051020.html) , this decision was poorly
reasoned and wrong. But it stands nonetheless.
However, the New York Court of Appeals—the state’s highest court—muddied the waters
in 2010, when it decided Debra H. v. Janice R. (http://law.justia.com/cases/new
york/courtofappeals/2010/201003755.html) There, the court held that a lesbian
spouse acquired parental rights with respect to her partner’s biological child because the
two women had entered into a civil union before the child’s birth. In reaching that
conclusion, the court claimed to be deferring to Vermont law, which ostensibly gave civil
union partners legal parentage rights over their partners’ children conceived or born
during the union. (As I discuss here
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100511.html) and here
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100525.html) , this case would have been
more sensibly predicated on the de facto parentage doctrine, in part because the court’s
understanding and application of Vermont parentage law lacked some necessary nuance.)
It deferred to Vermont’s treatment of the civil union on grounds of comity, the general
principle of respect for sister states that is the animating force behind interstate marriage
recognition law. (Despite the O’ReillyMorshead court’s statements to the contrary,
marriages are not judgments and thus are not entitled to full faith and credit.)
The question, then, is whether a New York court should give effect to a Vermont civil
union for purposes of starting the clock on the acquisition of marital property. Given New
York’s expansive approach to interstate marriage recognition—the highest court has
never refused to give effect to an outofstate marriage, even when the particular
marriage type had been abolished by statute—it would make sense for courts to err on the
side of recognition even for a status with an unfamiliar name. After all, under Vermont
law in effect at the time of this couple’s union, the civil union was defined to be identical
to marriage in every respect other than name. Why, given the Court of Appeals’s ruling in
Debra H., wouldn’t this lead the court to err on the side of recognition? And given that
the U.S. Supreme Court has now held that all bans on marriages by samesex couples—
the very system that led to the necessity of the civil union—are unconstitutional, wouldn’t
the obvious tendency be to avoid reinforcing the harm of the nowdefunct secondclass
system?
Moreover, the O’ReillyMorshead court expressly considers whether the civil union
signals the beginning of an economic partnership sufficient to trigger equitable
distribution rights—but concludes that it does not. This is a strange conclusion given that
Vermont law clearly subjected civil union partners to precisely the same equitable
distribution rules as married couples. The couple voluntarily opted for a status with
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/24/thoughobsoletethecivilunioncontinuestomystifycourts
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mandatory propertysharing obligations and, when given the chance to enter civil
marriage, entered that as well. Although the court suggests that the party seeking
equitable distribution in this case was seeking “broader ‘marital property’ rights than
exist under New York law,” that is really not true. She was seeking the same marital
property rights as any other spouse.
The trial court in this case refused to start the propertysharing clock from the date of the
civil union. Rather, in its view, the clock started three years later when the couple married
in Canada. Apparently, it was during this window that the only valuable piece of property
was purchased.
Could Cohabitants’ Rights Come into Play?
The court also considers, but curiously rejects, the argument that the couple had entered
into an express propertysharing contract that would result in the same remedy as the
application of equitable distribution principles. Under New York law, a married couple
has propertysharing rights upon divorce because of the status of marriage. But
unmarried couples can create the same rights by contract. Although New York rejected
the broad view of “palimony” countenanced by the California Supreme Court in Marvin
v. Marvin (http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supremecourt/3d/18/660.html)
, which allows for propertysharing rights based on a variety of principles including
unjust enrichment, it has upheld express propertysharing contracts between unmarried
cohabitants. Under the applicable precedents, the express agreement does not have to be
in writing. There merely needs to be proof that the couple expressly agreed to enter an
economic partnership with propertysharing rights. At the very minimum, doesn’t entry
into a civil union satisfy that requirement? The couple entered a formal status that came
with full rights (and obligations) of equitable distribution and even alimony. What greater
evidence could there be of a couple’s intent to entangle their economic lives and share the
spoils? But the court in this case refuses to recognize this as an independent theory of
recovery.
Conclusion
Having rejected what it viewed as the only viable theory of recovery, the court ruled that
the disputed piece of property in this case was the separate property of its owner and
could not be divided. The court dissolved the civil union, but refused to engage in the
process of equitable distribution that normally takes place in a divorce proceeding. The
civil union, even in its obsolescence, thus continues to perpetuate a system of second
class citizenship.
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